School Transport Safety: Fifteen-Year Vehicle-Age Limit Upheld for Educational Institutions

The High Court upheld Clause (xi) of Rule 73-A(1)A of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999, which prohibited vehicles used to provide transportation facilities to schools from being more than 15 years old. The Court held that the State Government had authority under Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to prescribe permit-related conditions for school and educational-institution vehicles; the restriction was a preventive safety measure and was neither arbitrary nor inconsistent with Section 59. The expression “School” in the relevant conditions was construed to include educational institutions subject to the general conditions under Rule 73-A(1)A. (Paras 61–81).

Key Proposition: The State Government may, in exercise of its rule-making power under Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, prescribe a maximum age of 15 years for vehicles used to transport students to schools and educational institutions, and such a permit condition is not invalid merely because the vehicle may remain roadworthy or usable for other purposes.

• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 59, 76 and 96 – Delegated legislation – Whether the State could prescribe a 15-year age limit for vehicles providing transport facilities to schools? – Held, yes. (Paras 39–65)
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 96(2)(xxxiii) – Permit conditions – Whether Rule 73-A(1)A(xi) exceeded the State’s rule-making competence or conflicted with Section 59? – Held, no. (Paras 61–68)
• Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999 – Rule 73-A(1)A(xi) – Educational institutions – Whether the restriction applied only to conventional schools up to Class 10 or 10+2? – Held, no; it applied to all educational institutions bound by the general conditions in Rule 73-A(1)A. (Paras 74–81)

Background / Synopsis :

• Twenty-one writ petitions were heard together because they raised common questions concerning Clause (xi) of Rule 73-A(1)A of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999, inserted by notification dated 12 October 2018.
• The petitioners included schools, educational societies and institutions such as nursing and other educational establishments. They challenged the condition that vehicles providing transportation facilities to schools could not be more than 15 years old.
• The petitioners contended that the restriction ignored the actual roadworthiness and limited daily use of their vehicles, imposed financial burdens and was beyond the State Government’s legislative and rule-making competence. Some petitioners also argued that institutions which were not conventional schools were outside the clause.
• The State relied on the need to strengthen school-transport safety following the Nurpur school bus accident of 9 April 2018, in which 27 persons, including 23 schoolchildren, lost their lives. A High-Level Committee was constituted, draft safety guidelines were circulated for stakeholder comments and the State thereafter inserted Rule 73-A.

Issues For Consideration :

• Whether the State Government possessed authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to insert Rule 73-A and prescribe the 15-year vehicle-age condition.
• Whether Clause (xi) was inconsistent with Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which empowers the Central Government to specify the life of motor vehicles.
• Whether the age restriction was arbitrary under Article 14, particularly where a vehicle remained roadworthy and was used for limited distances.
• Whether Clause (xi) applied to educational institutions such as nursing and pharmacy institutions, or only to schools imparting education up to Class 10 or 10+2.

Submissions Of Parties :

Petitioners – Schools and Educational Institutions:

• The petitioners argued that the 15-year limit had been imposed without assessing the actual condition or roadworthiness of each vehicle. They contended that a well-maintained vehicle could remain fit for use beyond 15 years and that fitness inspections, rather than age alone, should determine eligibility.
• They submitted that Section 59 vested the Central Government with power to specify the life of motor vehicles and that the State could not create an equivalent age-based prohibition through a rule under the general power in Section 96.
• They argued that the restriction was arbitrary, economically burdensome and discriminatory, particularly because other public and private vehicles more than 15 years old could continue transporting passengers.
• Some petitioners contended that nursing, pharmacy and other institutions were not “Schools” and therefore could not be subjected to Clause (xi).

Respondents – State of Himachal Pradesh:

• The State submitted that Section 96 empowered it to frame rules to give effect to Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act, including conditions relating to private service vehicle permits under Section 76.
• It argued that student safety was paramount and that the 15-year restriction was a preventive measure suited to the State’s predominantly hilly terrain. The rule did not prohibit the use of the vehicle for other lawful purposes after 15 years.
• The State explained that the amendment followed the Nurpur school bus tragedy, constitution of a High-Level Committee, circulation of draft guidelines and consideration of stakeholder suggestions.
• It contended that the word “School” in Clause (xi), read harmoniously with Rule 73-A and its heading, covered all educational institutions subject to the general conditions.

Court's Observations & Analysis :

Re: Source and scope of the State’s rule-making power

• The Court examined Sections 2(11), 2(24), 2(31), 59, 76 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 76 permits the Regional Transport Authority to grant private service vehicle permits and attach prescribed conditions. Section 96 authorises the State Government to make rules for carrying into effect Chapter V, including matters which may be prescribed. (Paras 24–35)
• Rule 73-A was framed as a set of conditions capable of being inscribed in permits relating to buses or vehicles owned by, or attached to, schools and educational institutions. The Court held that its source of power was traceable to Section 96, read with the permit framework under Section 76. (Paras 61–65)
• The Court applied the principles governing judicial review of subordinate legislation: identify the source of power, construe the subordinate legislation and determine whether it remains within the scope of the delegated authority. (Paras 59–64)
• Held: The State had the requisite rule-making competence. Rule 73-A was not ultra vires the parent Act merely because it prescribed conditions governing vehicles used under private service vehicle permits. (Paras 61–65)

Re: Relationship between Section 59 and the 15-year restriction

• The petitioners relied on Section 59, which empowers the Central Government to specify the life of motor vehicles for the purposes stated in that provision. The Court distinguished the general statutory power to specify the life of a motor vehicle from the State’s power to prescribe conditions governing a particular category of permit and use. (Paras 39–46, 58)
• The Court held that the impugned clause did not declare a vehicle unusable for every purpose after 15 years. It restricted its use for providing transportation facilities to schools. A vehicle could continue to be used for another lawful purpose if it remained duly registered and otherwise complied with the Act and Rules. (Paras 43–58, 69)
• The Court also referred to comparable rules in Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, which prescribed age restrictions of 12 or 15 years for educational-institution vehicles. (Paras 66–68)
• Held: Clause (xi) did not offend Section 59 or exceed the State’s power under Section 96. (Paras 61–68, 81)

Re: Arbitrariness and student safety

• The Court considered the State’s explanation that the amendment followed the Nurpur school bus accident of 9 April 2018, in which 27 persons, including 23 children, died. The Court referred to the Division Bench proceedings that brought the issue of school transport safety before the Court and to the subsequent process leading to Rule 73-A. (Paras 36–37)
• The restriction was treated as a preventive safety measure. The Court considered that age-related structural fatigue, material degradation, outdated safety technology and the risk of mechanical failure might not be fully addressed by periodic fitness inspections alone. (Paras 69–73)
• The Court held that the economic burden on institutions did not outweigh the safety of students. The rule did not render the vehicles wholly unusable after 15 years; it only restricted their use for school transportation. (Paras 69–73)
• The Court rejected the argument that the restriction was arbitrary merely because students might also travel in other older vehicles. The State could adopt a specific safety measure for vehicles identified and used by educational institutions to transport students. (Para 70)
• Held: The 15-year limit was not arbitrary and did not violate Article 14. (Paras 69–73, 81)

Re: Meaning of “School” and application to other educational institutions

• The Court examined the heading and structure of Rule 73-A, which referred to buses and vehicles owned or attached to “School/Educational Institutions”. It also considered the definition of “Educational Institution” and “School” reproduced from Black’s Law Dictionary. (Paras 74–80)
• Rule 73-A(1)A prescribed general conditions applicable to all categories of vehicles used to transport school children. The Court held that Clause (xi) had to be read in harmony with the other general conditions and the overall purpose of the Rule. (Paras 75–80)
• An institution which was required to comply with Clauses (i) to (x) and (xii) to (xx) could not claim exemption from Clause (xi) alone. The term “School” was therefore not confined to institutions imparting education only up to Class 10 or 10+2. (Para 80)
• Held: The restriction applied to all educational institutions to which the general conditions in Rule 73-A(1)A applied, including nursing, pharmacy, engineering and medical institutions. (Paras 80–81)

Notable Observations: None.

Decision & Directions :

• All the connected writ petitions were dismissed as devoid of merit.
• The Court upheld the notification dated 12 October 2018 inserting Rule 73-A into the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999.
• Clause (xi) of Rule 73-A(1)A, restricting vehicles providing transportation facilities to schools from being more than 15 years old, was held to be within the State’s rule-making competence and neither arbitrary nor contrary to Sections 59 or 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
• The Court held that the clause applied to all educational institutions subject to the general conditions under Rule 73-A(1)A and was not limited to conventional schools up to Class 10 or 10+2.
• Interim orders were vacated forthwith. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stood disposed of. No order as to costs.

Legal Provisions Discussed & Precedents Cited :

• Constitution of India – Article 14: Equality before law; the petitioners invoked it to challenge the 15-year age restriction as arbitrary.
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 2(11): Defines an educational institution bus.
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 2(24): Defines a medium passenger motor vehicle.
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 2(31): Defines a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority.
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 59: Central Government’s power to specify the life of a motor vehicle.
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 76: Application for and conditions attached to a private service vehicle permit.
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 96, including Section 96(2)(xxxiii): State Government’s power to make rules for carrying into effect Chapter V and for prescribed matters.
• Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999 – Rule 73-A(1)A(xi): Provides that vehicles used to provide transportation facilities to schools shall not be more than 15 years old.
• State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 – Referred to: Principles governing judicial review of subordinate legislation.
• Naresh Chandra Aggarwal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, (2024) 13 SCC 241 – Referred to: Principles for determining whether subordinate legislation is ultra vires the parent statute.
• Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana Motor Vehicles Rules – Referred to comparatively in relation to age limits for educational-institution vehicles.

Case Details :

• Case / Party Name: Shivalik Institute of Nursing v. State of Himachal Pradesh and connected petitioners v. State of Himachal Pradesh and another
• Case Number(s): CWP No.11377 of 2025 with CWP Nos.20070, 20934, 20936 and 20937 of 2025; CWP Nos.1680, 1697, 1819, 2704, 2950, 2982, 5716, 5998, 6015, 7769, 11604, 11930, 12225, 16349, 16446 and 17386 of 2026
• Coram / Judges: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel and Justice Yogesh Jaswal – Division Bench
• Counsel Appearances: For the petitioners: M/s Nitin Thakur, Mohit Thakur, K.B. Khajuria, Vijender Katoch, Gaurav Thakur (vice Dr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar), Ajay Sharma, Shubham Singh Guleria and Vishal Thakur, Advocates. For the State: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with M/s Ramakant Sharma and Sushant Keprate, Additional Advocates General, and Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Assistant Advocate General.

Disclaimer: This summary is an editorial aid and does not form part of the judgment. Refer to the original judgment before citing.